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The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, if deployed to its full potential, should emerge as one of 
the most powerful instruments of human rights protection in the globe and will progressively expose the 
folly of Brexit. The aim of this paper is to examine the impact and potential of the EU Charter at the 
domestic level and to link it with the Brexit process. 
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I welcome gratefully the invitation to participate in the worthwhile and interesting e-NACT project.1 I 
have been preaching for several years the gospel that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights2 lacks 
profile and visibility in the legal systems of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland and Scotland. My 
interaction with judicial colleagues from other EU Member States suggests that the experience is similar 
in many other countries. This project is, therefore, both welcome and overdue.  
The EU Charter represented the culmination of several decades work of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union3 and its predecessor4 during which active, imaginative and penetrating judicial 
interpretation and application of EU law had discovered and proclaimed fundamental rights. The Charter 
is a vindication of the tireless work of dedicated supranational Judges. This reflection on its own 
underlines the importance of the e-NACT project. 
The judicial role, of course, continues and is, arguably, more important than ever before. The 
fundamental difference between the preceding era and the present era is that the rights of EU citizens 
are proclaimed visibly and unambiguously in a model which is transparent, unequivocal and dynamic. 
The rights enjoyed by citizens of the Union are more concrete, tangible and accessible than ever before. 
A new era in the EU legal order has dawned. The hallmarks of this new legal order include visibility, 
coherency, accessibility and transparency. The Charter represents both the vindication and the 
codification of the jurisprudence of the ECJ/CJEU, which developed the cornerstone principles of equal 
treatment, non-discrimination, transparency, legitimate expectations and the legal recognition and 
protection of other fundamental rights and freedoms.5 
Article 6(3) TEU is to be viewed against the framework outlined above. It provides that fundamental 
rights shall constitute general principles of EU law. It proclaims that “fundamental rights” consist of 
those rights guaranteed by the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms6, 
together with rights embedded in the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.  
2. The Title Deeds of the EU Charter 
It is trite that in order to assess the impact and scope of the Charter an understanding of its roots is 
essential. This exercise is particularly apposite at a stage in history when the European Union is 
overburdened by unprecedented doubts and challenges. 
                                                     
1  The e-learning National Active Charter Training (e-NACT) Project is a DG Justice supported project providing for a 
training methodology and training activities that, coupled with the expertise of the trainers involved, foster the emergence 
and consolidation of a common culture of fundamental rights. The e-NACT builds on previous Charter related projects 
developed by the CJCm such as ACTIONES. For more information visit the website of of the project 
https://www.eui.eu/Projects/CentreForJudicialCooperation/Projects/e-NACT/e-NACT . 
2 The “EU Charter”. 
3 The “CJEU”. 
4 The ECJ. 
5 From the earliest days of the ECJ jurisprudence, see, for example, Stauder – Case 29/69 – “Fundamental Rights (are) 
enshrined in the general principles of Community law and protected by the Court”. 
6 “ECHR” 
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As is well known, the EU Charter had a lengthy period of gestation. It was an instrument of (mere) 
soft law following its initial adoption.7 Following a sluggish, rather than meteoric, progression from the 
status of mere political statement, it was ultimately incarnated in the form of an international treaty of 
equal value with the TEU and the TFEU, a directly effective measure of EU primary law, entering into 
force in tandem with the Lisbon Treaty on 01 November 2009.8 From any perspective, the Charter 
represents a landmark achievement for the Member States of the European Union. Standing proudly as 
one of the three dominant instruments of governance of the EU, it is, in effect, a legally binding bill of 
rights, resembling the catalogues of rights to be found in the constitutions of EU Member States.  
The Preamble to the Charter reveals its diverse origins and sources of inspiration, as well as 
proclaiming its rationale and aims. It recalls the post-war resolution of the peoples of Europe “to share 
a peaceful future based on common values”. It draws on the “spiritual and moral heritage of the Union”, 
which is founded on the “indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and 
solidarity”. Its most important statement, arguably, is the reaffirmation that the Union is “based on the 
principles of democracy and the rule of law”. 
The Preamble boldly proclaims that through the twin mechanisms of Union citizenship and the 
creation of an area of freedom, security and justice, the EU “places the individual at the heart of its 
activities”. It emphasises, on the one hand, the common values of the Member States and, on the other, 
the respect to be accorded to “the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe”, their 
national identities and how they are governed at national, regional and local levels. Furthermore, the 
Preamble explicitly recognises the principle of subsidiarity. 
Through the Preamble one learns that the EU Charter is not designed to be merely declaratory in 
nature and effect. Rather, it is based on the recognition that “… it is necessary to strengthen the 
protection of fundamental rights”.9 What are the origins of these rights? They derive from –  
“… the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the 
[ECHR], the Social Charters adopted by the Union and by the Council of Europe and the case law 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union and of the European Court of Human Rights”.  
From the judicial perspective, this lengthy list of sources is important, for at least two reasons. First, it 
provides an insight into the scope and potential of the Charter in practice. Second, it will be permissible 
for Judges to have resort to these sources in resolving issues concerning the interpretation and 
application of the Charter.  
The manifest diversity, breadth and versatility of the Charter are amongst its hallmarks. These traits 
can be readily traced to the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Statute of the Council of 
Europe (1949) and the Treaty of Rome (1950) and, to a lesser extent, the Refugee Convention (1951) 
followed by and in tandem with the progressive jurisprudence of the CJEU and the increasingly 
influential case law of the ECtHR. 
Drawing on all of these sources, the Preamble to the TEU enunciates the following: 
“Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which 
we have developed the universal values of the unviable and inalienable rights of the human person, 
freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law”. 
This is to be juxtaposed with Article 1 TEU: 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. 
                                                     
7 By the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 07 December 2000. 
8 Per Article 6(1) TEU, the Charter “shall have the same legal value as the Treaties”. 
9 My emphasis. 
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These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between men and women prevail.” 
Harmonious with this provision, one of the EU’s stated aims in its relations with the wider world is the 
protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child.10 The following words, arguably, reflect 
the Charter’s most novel feature: 
“[The Union] places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the 
Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice.” 
3. The Panorama of the EU Charter 
Panoramically, the Lisbon Reforms of 2009 effected a significant transformation of the EU landscape, 
with a greater emphasis on human rights protection than ever before. The human rights development in 
EU law was the product of evolution, not revolution: a gentle, orderly and judge led process which, 
viewed in retrospect, appears a natural progression. It is nonetheless remarkable given that human rights 
did not feature in the European Treaties in their original incarnation. There was no bill of rights and 
nothing equivalent thereto. 
But the creation of the EEC did not occur in isolation. One cannot ignore the (more or less) 
simultaneous adoption of the Statute of the Council of Europe which, in common with its EEC 
counterpart, had as one of its aims the achievement of greater unity amongst European states in the midst 
of the devastation caused by the Second World War. Thus the Statute devised an elaborate human rights 
protection model, the ECHR, as its marquee mechanism. The resulting interaction and approximation 
between the two regimes – the EU and the Council of Europe – was, in hindsight, predictable, if not 
seamless. With the passage of time each would, inevitably, be influenced by the other and absorb the 
other to an appropriate extent. 
Viewed retrospectively, it was inevitable that the EU Institutions, in particular the CJEU, would be 
alert not merely to the activities under the umbrella of the ECHR. The CJEU also found itself operating 
in an environment in which many of the Member States had written constitutions. It is, therefore, 
unsurprising that these constitutions – which are given explicit recognition in the Charter – have 
influenced the evolution of EU law, not least because of the composition of the CJEU, particularly in 
cases involving an interface between EU law and national constitutional law. It is clearly foreseeable 
that national constitutions will have some impact in cases involving the Charter.11 
The Charter’s broad panorama and extensive reach are reflected in the post-Lisbon activities of both 
the CJEU and the Union legislative, executive and administrative bodies. In all of these contexts, issues 
of fundamental rights have centred on the Charter. In the activities of these organs, the Charter has, 
progressively, become a reference point. It operates as a compass, a benchmark, for the development of 
EU policies. In principle, the benefits which this should bring for EU citizens are stronger and more 
effective rights in the product resulting from each policy development and legislative process. 
Furthermore, the Charter’s prominence in the jurisprudence of the CJEU has steadily increased. 
As appears from the background outlined above, the rationale for this state of affairs includes the 
following: 
(a) The Charter has enhanced legitimacy on account of its democratic origins, being preceded by two 
solemn conventions reflecting the deliberations of the governments of Member States, the European 
Parliament and the national parliaments of the Member States.  
(b) There are clearly identifiable constitutional elements in the two preceding conventions.  
                                                     
10 Per Article 2(3) TEU. 
11 See Kremzow v Austria [1997] ECR I – 2629. 
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(c) The Charter draws heavily upon the ECHR and other human rights instruments which are binding 
on all EU Member States. 
(d) The Charter also relies on the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. 
(e) The Charter is a modern, visible, comprehensible and co-defying instrument. 
(f) The Charter is legally binding and, generally at least, has direct effect. 
(g) Finally, and fundamentally, the Charter is one of the constitutional instruments of governance of the 
EU and enjoys the same status as the others.  
4. The EU Charter in Practice 
Judges have much to learn from each other in this respect. The e-NACT Project provides a valuable 
forum for indispensable judicial interaction and dialogue. 
In the abstract, the operation of the EU Charter can be studied in the following separate juridical 
contexts:  
(a) CJEU.  
(b) The ECtHR.  
(c) In the Member State to which any given Judge belongs. 
(d) In other Member States.  
In this context the most important provision of the Charter is Article 51, which limits its operation to 
cases and situations where Member States are “implementing Union law”. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to dilate on how Article 51 has been interpreted and applied by the CJEU. It suffices to say that 
this issue has featured in several important decisions.12 There has also been much academic discussion.13 
In the present context, I confine myself to the self-evident truism that fundamental Union Rights must 
be respected when Union law is engaged, in furtherance of the principle of uniform application and 
interpretation of Union law. In its jurisprudence, the CJEU has treated “implementing” and “within the 
scope of” as synonymous terms, reasoning that this accords with the Explanations to the Charter.14 
The CJEU 
The progressively increasing number of CJEU decisions in which the Charter features speaks for itself. 
It demonstrates the speed with which the Charter, post-Lisbon, has become the central source of 
reference as regards Union fundamental rights.15 In some of the decisions, the Charter features only 
tangentially. In others, it occupies a position of prominence. It is, of course, true that in some cases the 
outcome would probably have been the same applying the pre-Lisbon fundamental rights as general 
principles of Union law. 
                                                     
12 See in particular Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 (NS and MS), at [116] – [112]; Case C-256/11 (Dereci) at [71] – 
[72]; and Case C-617/10, Akerberg Fransson, at [18].  
13 Much of which has involved Judge Allan Rosas, former President of the 10th Chamber of the CJEU. See, for example, “The 
Applicability of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights at National Level”, 13 European Yearbook on Human Rights. 
14 Which, by virtue of Article 6(1) TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, must be taken into account in its interpretation. See 
[2007] OJ C303/17, at 32. 
15 See the valuable collection of cases in the CJC/EUI Handbooks on the Techniques of Judicial Interaction in the Application 
of the EU Charter (Dr Madalina Moraru), available at 
https://www.eui.eu/Projects/CentreForJudicialCooperation/Documents/D1.1.b-Module-2.pdf . 
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The potency of the Charter is illustrated by the decisions in Volker and Schecke.16 These combined 
cases concerned the validity of certain provisions of Council Regulation (EC) 1290/2005 on the 
financing of common agricultural policy, a subsequent amending regulation and an implementing 
regulation. The legal issues raised concerned the relationship between two of the Charter rights, namely 
the right to protection of personal data (Article 8) and the right to respect for private life (Article 7) and 
the principle of transparency. This latter principle is implicit in Articles 1, 2, 6 and 10 TEU and Article 
15 TFEU. It forms part of principles of democracy and the rule of law itself.  
The Court noted that the protection of personal data is not an absolute right but must be considered 
in relation to its function in society. Thus it was necessary to determine whether the Union institutions 
had properly balanced the interest in guaranteeing the transparency of its act and ensuring the best use 
of public funds against the interference with the right of the beneficiaries concerned to respect for their 
private life in general and the protection of their personal data in particular.17 The Court decided that the 
institutions had not carried out a proper balancing exercise as regards the publication of the names of 
natural persons. To this extent the legislative act was held to be invalid. The Court, however, was 
satisfied that the balancing exercise in respect of legal persons had been properly conducted.  
In the field of immigration and asylum, the most important Charter decision of the CJEU is, by some 
measure, NS and ME.18 The central issue raised in these combined Article 267 references was whether 
the mechanism contained in the Dublin Regulation19 to refrain from sending an asylum applicant to the 
Member State which, under the Dublin Regulation criteria, is responsible for examining the application, 
may become a duty precluding such transfer where the responsible Member State does not respect EU 
Fundamental rights and/or the EU measures relating to asylum.  
The Charter provision which featured most prominently is Article 4, which prohibits torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Court held that Article 4 precludes such a transfer 
in circumstances where the transferring Member State cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in 
the asylum procedures and reception conditions of the responsible Member State –  
“… amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of 
being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment.” 
The test is not that of alleged violations of fundamental rights or the EU asylum instruments. Rather, it 
concerns systemic and serious deficiencies in the procedures, arrangements and conditions in the 
responsible Member States.  
In NS and ME, the decision under challenge entailed a proposal to return three asylum applicants 
from the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland to Greece. There was a heavy focus on the 
discretionary examination provision of Article 3(2) of Dublin II. The first question for the CJEU was 
whether a Member State’s decision under Article 3(2) falls within the scope of EU law for the purposes 
of Article 6 TEU and/or Article 51 of the Charter. The Court answered this question affirmatively.20 The 
Court’s reasoning on the substantive issues drew on the Common European Asylum System, which is 
based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention and the guarantee that no person 
will be returned to a place where they risk being persecuted.  
The Court also referred to Article 18 of the EU Charter. This provides, under the rubric “Right to 
Asylum”: 
                                                     
16 Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 [2010] ECR I-111063. 
17 See [48], [68] and [83] and [85]-[86]. 
18 Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10. 
19 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003. 
20 See [69]. 
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“The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 
28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance 
with the Treaty establishing the European Community.” 
I interpose at this juncture the formal “Explanation”:  
“The text of the Article is based on TEC Article 63 which requires the Union to respect the Geneva 
Convention on Refugees. Reference should be made to the Protocols relating to the United Kingdom 
and Ireland annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam and to Denmark to determine the extent to which 
those Member States implement Community Law in this area and the extent to which this Article is 
applicable to them. This Article is in line with the Protocol on Asylum annexed to the EC Treaty.” 
Finally, the Court highlighted the principle of mutual trust among EU Member States. The Court 
concluded:  
(a) There can be no conclusive presumption that the responsible Member State observes the 
fundamental rights of the EU.  
(b) The transfer by a Member State to the responsible Member State is unlawful where the former is 
aware of systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and reception conditions of the second State 
such as to amount to substantial grounds for believing that the claimant would face a real risk of 
inhuman or degrading treatment. This would be unlawful as contrary to Article 4 of the EU 
Charter.21 
(c) Articles 1 (the right to human dignity), 18 and 47 (the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial) 
of the Charter do not require a different answer to the questions raised. 
Finally, the Grand Chamber declined to construe the joint UK/Polish protocol as conferring any 
exemption on either of these Member States from the fundamental obligation to comply with the 
Charter.22 What had once been triumphantly paraded by the United Kingdom as an “opt out” clause, a 
landmark victory in the constant battle against the tide of EU legislation, dissolved, aided by a UK 
concession, into a veritable damp squib.  
The ECtHR 
Taking into account the ever evolving relationship between the ECtHR and the CJEU, coupled with the 
proposed accession of the EU to the ECHR, a brief survey of the impact of the EU Charter in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR is instructive. In this way one discovers that the ECtHR has developed an 
assumption that those responsible for formulating EU law intend it to be compatible with the ECHR. 
See, for example, Bosphorus Turzim v Ireland.23 This assumption seems unremarkable, having regard 
to the history of the Charter outlined above.  
One finds references to the EU Charter in a small number of cases only. These include Goodwin v 
United Kingdom24 which concerned the rights of transsexuals to marry. While these proceedings placed 
the focus on Articles 8 and 12 ECHR, the Court, in its judgment, highlighted the different wording of 
Article 9 of the Charter in support of its conclusion that there had been major changes, particularly 
social, in the approach to transsexuality and marriage since the adoption of the ECHR half a century 
previously. 
                                                     
21 Paragraphs [94] and [106]. 
22 At [120]. 
23 No 45036/98. At [73] especially. 
24 No 28957/95. 
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In Vallianatos v Greece25 the ECtHR, in holding that a Greek law permitting civil unions only 
between adults of different sex infringed Articles 8 and 14 ECHR, invoked several provisions of the EU 
Charter – Articles 7, 9 and 21, together with the 2006 Commentary prepared by the EU network of 
independent experts on fundamental rights.  
There are two decisions of the ECtHR which have an important bearing on the subject of the e-NACT 
Project. The first is MSS v Belgium and Greece26, where the complaint was that the Greek procedures 
for the reception of asylum claimants and the processing of their claims were so inadequate that they 
constituted ill treatment contrary to Article 3 ECtHR. This particular litigation prompts the observation 
that the ECHR does not contain any right to asylum. When it was being developed, the prevailing 
thinking was that individual states should, harmonious with one of the ancient rights enjoyed by all 
states, be left to decide for themselves whom they would permit to cross their borders. Those drafting 
the ECHR were also aware that a major instrument under the auspices of the United Nations was in 
gestation. This contrasts with Article 18 of the EU Charter.27 
In holding that Greece was in violation of Article 3 ECHR regarding both detention and living 
conditions and that Belgium was similarly in violation of Article 3 ECHR for transferring asylum 
claimants to Greece, thereby exposing them to the risk of such ill treatment, the Strasbourg Court relied 
more on the concept of “fundamental rights” than the EU Charter. This is understandable, given that 
from 01 December 2009 the TEU had provided not only that the EU “… recognises the rights, freedoms 
and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights”, but also that –  
“Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the [ECHR] and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.”28 
In a similarly landmark decision, Hirsi Jamaa v Italy29, the question for the ECtHR was whether Italy 
had violated Article 3 ECHR by intercepting a boat replete with potential asylum applicants in the 
Mediterranean Ocean and forcing their return to Libya. Notably, the Strasbourg Court’s deliberations 
included Article 19 of the EU Charter, which provides: 
“(1) Collective expulsions are prohibited.  
(2) No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he 
or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.” 
The Court’s approach was that Article 19 reinforced the principle of non-refoulement which it has long 
espoused and lent support to its conclusion that Article 3 ECHR had been infringed.  
The following summary seems appropriate. The ECtHR is prepared to draw on the EU Charter as a 
source of influence, or guidance, in its interpretation and application of the ECHR. However, the Charter 
has not been accorded any special status. Rather, it has been treated by the ECtHR on a par with other 
sources of international law. The Charter’s influence has been most noticeable in relation to Article 6 
ECHR. It has also had some influence in Article 3 cases involving asylum claimants. Clearly, the Charter 
cannot be a source of law which in some way usurps the ECHR itself. In principle, the CJEU may 
interpret provisions of the Charter comparable to/overlapping with ECHR provisions more generously 
than the ECtHR has done to date. Equally, in principle, the ECtHR may seek to maintain its more 
restrictive, conservative interpretation of such provisions. In reality, the more likely scenario appears to 
be that the CJEU will take its lead from the ECtHR. The full potential of the Charter in the realm of the 
ECHR has not yet been fulfilled. 
                                                     
25 No 29381/09. 
26 App No 30696/09. 
27 See paragraph 3.5 supra. 
28 Article 6(3) 
29 Number 27765/09. 
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I suggest that the following proposition is tenable: in the realm of protection of human rights 
involving the 28 Member States of the EU and the 47 States parties of the Council of Europe, a two way 
street is discernible – the ECtHR can have resort to the EU Charter as a source of rights, while (and to 
a rather greater extent) the CJEU can, similarly, invoke the ECHR. A further source common to each of 
these supranational regimes is, of course, the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. 
United Kingdom Cases 
The United Kingdom, though (uniquely) having no written constitution, is a single constitutional entity, 
consisting of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, for reasons of history, tradition and 
devolution, each of these three countries operates a legal system differing from the others. The exercise 
of considering the operation and influence of the Charter in these three countries is not a difficult one. 
Furthermore, it is instructive to consider how the Charter has fared in the Republic of Ireland. 
It is no understatement to suggest that the impact of the EU Charter in the United Kingdom has been 
far from dramatic. An understanding of why is not easy. Some of the reasons undoubtedly include the 
following: 
(a) The distracting and somewhat confusing UK/Poland Protocol.  
(b) The relative moratorium generated by the combined UK/ROI Article 267 references in NS and 
ME.30 
(c) The intrinsic limitations of the Charter flowing from Article 51(1). 
(d) The unique and challenging architecture of the Charter: rights, freedoms, principles and 
“Explanations”.  
(e) Debates about direct effect. 
(f) The prominence of the ECHR in this jurisdiction consequent upon the Human Rights Act 1998.  
In the specific field of immigration and asylum, it must also be borne in mind that there is already 
extensive prescription of rights and duties. This flows not only from the Refugee Convention and its 
Protocol but also the series of EU legislative measures under the umbrella of the CEAS and the 
corresponding UK domestic law implementing/transposing measures. As a result, the EU Charter is 
rarely pleaded in immigration/asylum cases in the United Kingdom. Being a common law jurisdiction 
and having regard to the duty of courts and tribunals under Article 10 TEU, the absence of any such 
pleading does not, of course, preclude Judges from proactively raising Charter issues. However, the 
reality of life for immigration and asylum Judges in the United Kingdom is that the Charter features 
very rarely indeed. 
An exception to this is found in the decision of the United Kingdom Upper Tribunal (Immigration 
and Asylum Chamber)31 in Abdul (Section 55 – Article 24(3) Charter)32. This case concerned a national 
of Nigeria, aged 41, who had been continuously resident in the United Kingdom for 25 years and was 
the father of two daughters, aged 13 and 11 respectively, both British citizens. The father acquired a 
residence card qua family member of an EEA national. However, he was also a convicted offender and, 
following the imposition of a sentence of 4 ½ years imprisonment, the Secretary of State decided to 
order his deportation from the United Kingdom.  
In challenging this decision the Appellant relied on, inter alia, Article 24 of the EU Charter. Under 
the banner of “The Rights of the Child”, this provides:  
                                                     
30 Supra. 
31 “UTIAC”. 
32 [2016] UKUT 106 (IAC). 
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“(1) Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their wellbeing. 
They may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration on matters which 
concern them in accordance with their age and maturity. 
(2) In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, 
the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration. 
(3) Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct 
contact with both his or her parents, unless this is contrary to his or her interests.” 
 [Emphasis added.] 
The Appellant relied particularly on Article 24(3). 
In deciding the appeal, the Upper Tribunal held, firstly, that the gateway provisions of Article 51 
were satisfied. Next, it considered the decisions of the CJEU in Deticek v Sgueglia33 where the Court 
gave consideration to the interpretation of Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003, which concerns 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of Judges in matrimonial matters. The Court, reasoning 
that Article 24 enshrines a “fundamental” right, concluded that a measure which prevents the 
maintenance on a regular basis of a personal relationship and direct contact with both parents can be 
justified only by another interest of the child of such importance that it takes priority over the interest 
underlying that fundamental right.34  
The Upper Tribunal also considered a later decision of the CJEU, MCB v ELE35, a case which had a 
Hague Convention context involving the disputed return of a child from the United Kingdom to the 
Republic of Ireland. Having regard to the reasoning of the CJEU36 the Upper Tribunal held that the 
Court was suggesting that Article 24(3) adds nothing of substance to Article 24(2). The kernel of the 
Tribunal’s decision is contained in [30]: 
“I am of the opinion that Article 24(3) creates a free standing right. It may, of course, be viewed as 
the unequivocal articulation of a concrete “best interests” right and, on this analysis, is a 
development, or elaboration, of Article 24(2). Furthermore, given the exception formulated in the 
final clause of Article 24(3), the nexus with Article 24(2) is unmistakable. However, I consider it 
clear that Article 24(3) was designed to create a discrete right, an analysis which is harmonious with 
general principles of EU law. These include the well -known principle that every part of a measure 
of EU law is presumed to have a separate and individual effect and impact. Article 24(3) may also 
be viewed through the prism of the principle that where one has an amalgam of specific and general 
provisions, the former should normally be considered in advance of the latter. This construction is 
further fortified by the Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(published by the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights), at p207:  
“….. Children are no longer considered as mere recipients of services or beneficiaries of 
protective measures but rather as rights holders and participants in actions affecting them.” 
The Upper Tribunal has also ruled in a case in which the Applicant placed direct reliance on Article 18 
of the Charter. In R (Hagos) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Dublin Returns – Malta) 
IJR [2015] UKUT 0271 (IAC) the Applicant, a young male adult in good physical health, though 
suffering from mental health problems and asserting a risk of suicide, contended that his enforced return 
from the United Kingdom to Malta would violate his rights under Articles 18 and 47 of the Charter, 
Article 3 ECHR, Article 33 of the Refugee Convention and the Qualification Directive. The Applicant’s 
case was based on extensive evidence pointing to significant shortcomings in the Maltese processes and 
procedures for the consideration and determination of asylum claims, together with deficiencies in the 
arrangements and facilities for the treatment of asylum claimants with psychiatric problems.  
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The Upper Tribunal accepted, without deciding, that Article 18 of the Charter creates an individual, 
enforceable right to asylum, subject of course to the claimant satisfying the qualifying conditions.37 The 
Tribunal stated:  
“… [The Applicant] … was disposed to accept the Tribunal’s suggestion that any right to asylum 
established by Article 18 can only amount to a right to be granted asylum where the relevant 
qualifying conditions under the Refugee Convention and Protocol are satisfied. Given this, together 
with the clear nexus …. between Article 18 and the Geneva Convention and Protocols, it is far from 
clear that the former confers any new or additional right … 
However, without deciding this issue conclusively, for present purposes we are disposed to accept 
the Applicant’s contention that he has a right to have his asylum claim assessed in accordance with 
fair and efficient procedures which include the provision of appropriate information and legal advice 
and an effective remedy …”38 
The Upper Tribunal noted that this was the contention of UNHCR in its intervention before the CJEU 
in Halaf v Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees.39  
Bearing in mind that all asylum cases require of the court or tribunal concerned an assessment of 
future events, one of the questions which will have to be decided is the legal test to be applied, within 
the framework of Article 18 of the Charter, in making this judicial assessment. Is the focus on future 
possibilities or future probabilities? Alternatively phrased, how real must the risk of adverse future 
events be? Furthermore, in another case, the argument of the Secretary of State was that only a breach 
of either Article 4 or Article 19 of the Charter can prevent the removal of the Applicants to the country 
concerned (Malta). Even if the Upper Tribunal were persuaded that there is a real risk that such removal 
will (in particular) infringe their various procedural/process rights under Article 18, it was contended 
that this will not preclude their removal. This argument was based on the contention that the current 
jurisprudence of the CJEU does not recognise anything other than a real risk of a breach of Article 4 of 
the Charter. Judgment was expected in the summer of 2016.40 In the event, the appeal did not proceed. 
At this juncture, and in passing, it is instructive to note that in MCB the CJEU adopted a conservative 
approach to Article 7 of the Charter. It reasoned that given the almost identical phraseology of Article 8 
ECHR and Article 7, the latter should be given the same meaning and scope as the former (with the 
addition of the important qualification) “as interpreted by the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights”. While it may be said that in this instance the CJEU effectively sought refuge in Article 8 ECHR, 
one apprehends the advent of future cases in which this will be neither desirable nor legally viable. This 
may well arise, for example, in cases involving family reunification issues. One recalls that the EU 
Family Reunification Directive was adopted via Article 63(3)(a)(e)(c)41 which provides that for the 
purpose of developing a common immigration policy, the European Parliament and the Council shall 
adopt measures on, inter alia, the conditions of entry and residence and standards on the issue by 
Member States of long term visas and residence permits, which may include the purpose of family 
reunification. 
The EU Charter in the ECtHR and the CJEU 
In cases involving Charter rights which are comparable to those enshrined in the ECHR, one of the 
options available to any court is simply to mirror the Strasbourg jurisprudence. In Benkharbouche v 
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Embassy of Sudan42 employees of the Sudan Embassy in London brought claims alleging that they had 
been subjected to trafficking, discrimination, unlawful conditions of employment, harassment and 
discrimination. The claimants relied on, inter alia, Article 47 of the Charter, asserting their rights to an 
effective remedy and fair trial. This involved the question of whether Article 47 applies not only to EU 
institutions but also horizontally in cases where the gateway provision of Article 51 is satisfied. Both 
the High Court and the Court of Appeal answered this question affirmatively.43 The Court of Appeal 
reasoned that the right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter is a general 
principle of EU law and, therefore, has horizontal direct effect, subject to the exceptions found in the 
ECtHR jurisprudence and subject to any contrary provision of EU law. In thus deciding the Court of 
Appeal applied, without modification, the relevant ECHR jurisprudence. 
Notably, the CJEU has held that in cases where EU law requires it to do so it must go beyond simply 
mirroring Strasburg jurisprudence. See in particular Byankov v Glaven (ETC).44 This constitutes a 
progressive construction of Article 52(3) of the Charter. 
In passing, it is worth noting that while the results in Google Spain45 and Defi SA v Estonia46 are 
similar, the process of reasoning of the two supranational Courts is notably different. 
I have suggested above47 the most likely reasons to explain the minimal impact of the EU Charter in 
the United Kingdom. Further research on this would be welcome. 
The tepid impact of the EU Charter in the United Kingdom is mirrored in Scotland. Commentators 
in both jurisdictions have expressed surprise at this, given in particular that the Charter ventures 
significantly beyond those ECHR rights incorporated by the Human Rights Act 1998. While many (like 
me) have attributed this to a lack of knowledge and familiarity, I consider that, at this remove, this 
explanation has significantly reduced purchase. The decisions in the Scottish cases of McGeoch v 
Scottish Legal Aid Board48 (which concerned the availability of legal aid for a legal challenge to 
prisoner’s voting rights) and Walton v Scottish Ministers OH49 (which also concerned the availability 
of legal aid – in this instance for public planning enquiries) are indicative of a conservative approach. 
Notwithstanding, more may be expected and a less restrictive, more imaginable approach is clearly 
conceivable.  
The Republic of Ireland, in marked contrast with the other countries of the British islands, provides, 
in its case law, evidence of a positively dynamic and flourishing Charter. In this relatively remote EU 
Member State with a population of less than 5 million, why is this so? The operation of the Charter in 
this Member State is probably worthy of further study.50 While the jurisprudence of this country contains 
numerous examples, in the present context I confine myself to highlighting MN v Minister for Justice51: 
Article 47 – the right to be heard in the determination of applications for subsidiary protection and 
asylum; D v Refugee Appeals Tribunal52: a beguiling mix of Article 14 of the Charter, Article 2 of 
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47 In paragraph 4.21. 
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Protocol Number 1 ECHR, and Article 42 of the Constitution of Ireland; MCB53: Article 7 of the 
Charter/the Brussels II Regulation and the Irish Law requirement for agreement or a Court Order as a 
pre-requisite to the acquisition of child custody rights by an unmarried father; and Smith v Minister for 
Justice54: Article 7 of the Charter/Article 8 ECHR and the deportation of a family member.  
5. EU Charter: Quo Vadis? 
I presume to borrow a famous judicial pronouncement: 
“The first and foremost point is that the Treaty concerns only those matters which have a European 
element, that is to say matters which affect people and property in the 9 countries of the Common 
Market besides ourselves. The Treaty does not touch any of the matters which concern solely the 
mainland of England and the people in it. These are still governed by English law. They are not 
affected by the Treaty. But when we come to matters with a European element, the Treaty is like an 
incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the river. It cannot be held back ….”55 
The author of this statement is none other than Lord Denning. The developments during the intervening 
40 years demonstrate the correctness of this prediction. But does it hold good for the EU Charter? Only 
time will tell. Meantime, exercises such as the e-NACT Project will continue to make a vital contribution 
to the comprehension, influence and fortification of EU law.  
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PART II 
6. The EU Charter and Brexit 
The withdrawal of the United Kingdom (“UK”), constitutionally a single Member State which 
comprises England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland from the European Union (“EU”) is 
increasingly embroiled in controversy, acrimony and uncertainty at times bordering on confusion. This 
process has become popularly known as “BREXIT”.  
Brexit has the following main legal components: the primary legislation which made provision for 
the UK national referendum in June 2016; the referendum itself; the ensuing further primary legislation 
seeking to give effect to the referendum result – the EU (Withdrawal) Act 201856 - and, on the 
international plain, the draft Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration.57 Thus the Brexit 
mechanisms, not less than complicated, are a mixture of domestic legislation and international treaty. 
(a) While the June 2016 referendum “leave” vote represented a seminal event in the shared history of 
the UK and the EU, regarded in the eyes of many UK sectors and international audiences as 
retrograde and myopic, there are certain aspects of the situation of UK citizens living in Northern 
Ireland worthy of note:  
(b) By virtue of the statutory devolution arrangements which govern Northern Ireland constitutionally 
within the United Kingdom, the Northern Ireland legislature and executive58 are legally powerless 
regarding the final Brexit arrangements. The final international treaty, the parties whereto will be 
the UK and the EU, will, constitutionally, be an act of the executive ie the UK government. The 
population of Northern Ireland is 1.8 million, a mere 2.9% of the overall UK population. The role 
of this region of the United Kingdom has been relegated to one of political manoeuvring and 
lobbying.  
(c) All citizens of Northern Ireland are British nationals. Those who wish to do so can also obtain the 
nationality of the Republic of Ireland, an EU Member State. Many Northern Ireland citizens already 
possessed this dual nationality and many more have acquired, or will acquire, it. The members of 
this cohort are (or will be) EU citizens, with all of the associated rights and benefits.  
(d) There is one further measure of international law which could yet exert significant influence in the 
final Brexit arrangements. This is the Belfast Agreement (or so-called “Good Friday Agreement”) 
of 1998. This is an international treaty the parties whereto are the governments of the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. It does not bind either the EU en bloc or any other EU Member 
State in any way. However, the issue which is currently pending in judicial review proceedings in 
the UK is that of whether the much debated soi-disant “backstop” mechanism, currently a part of 
the draft Withdrawal Agreement/Political Declaration, infringes this treaty. The outcome of these 
proceedings (if completed) could have a significant impact on the state of play as at midnight on 31 
March 2019. If the English courts were to endorse this argument, this could push strongly in the 
direction of a “no deal” outcome. 
(e) The draft Withdrawal Agreement makes separate and particular provision for Ireland/Northern 
Ireland in a specially designed Protocol.59 
In the spheres of immigration/asylum/EU citizens’ freedom of movement Brexit will have obvious and 
lasting consequences. It is appropriate to begin with some mundane and sobering reflections. I refer 
firstly to the recent publication of a joint undertaking comprising law academics and human rights 
                                                     
56 The “Withdrawal Act”. 
57 Both still unexecuted at the time of writing [25/02/19].  
58 Both voluntarily suspended and inactive, since March 2017, at the time of writing. 
59 The Northern Ireland and Ireland Protocol 
Bernard McCloskey 
14 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
experts in Northern Ireland, “Brexit Law NI”.60 This report makes pessimistic predictions: a threat to 
the peace process; diminished international oversight of the protection of fundamental human rights and 
freedoms; a possible resulting conflict between communities which remain far from reconciled; and the 
growth of racism in both communities and, possibly, immigration enforcement action by public 
authorities. 
The following are allied with the foregoing:  
(a) There is a broad consensus that public perceptions (many of them misconceived) relating to 
immigration and asylum were one of the major forces in the “leave” vote. Pro-Brexit politicians and 
others campaigned forcefully on (inter alia) a “taking back our borders” platform. There has been 
progressive hostility to, and uncertainty for, the citizens of other EU Member States in the UK.  
(b) All of the signs are that, in its new domestic law arrangements, the UK will embrace more restrictive 
and less liberal immigration/asylum policies and arrangements.  
(c) Pre-referendum the environment and culture already had a hostile disposition towards non-British 
nationals. One of the clearest illustrations is the treatment of third country unaccompanied children. 
This is regarded by many, both within the UK and beyond, as unacceptable bordering on the 
inhumane.  
(d) Successive UK governments had already made clear their intention to reduce the numbers of non-
British nationals in the UK. Allied to this was the adoption of policies with acutely negative impacts 
on the dignity and rights of asylum claimants, predominantly in the areas of accommodation, 
employment and the most basic of financial support for survival. 
(e) Immigration and asylum law in the UK has long been criticised for its sheer volume and sometimes 
near impenetrable complexity.61 
(f) There is a long history of serious administrative failings in the immigration/asylum sphere in the 
UK: a bureaucratic system which has not been fit for purpose for a long time, dysfunctional 
computer systems, excessive delays, the loss of key records et al. 
(g) One of the entrenched UK government policies has, for some time, to legislate so as to drastically 
reduce the scope for appeals to the courts against adverse immigration/asylum decisions, while 
simultaneously increasing the range of so-called “out-of-country” appeals, strongly criticised 
judicially.62 The most senior immigration/asylum court in the UK has been driven to the lengths of 
trenchant criticism of the conduct of cases by the Government Legal Department.63 
In the midst of the swirling doubts and questions surrounding the final Brexit arrangements, there is one 
indelible certainty: from the first draft of the Withdrawal Act to its final incarnation, it has been stated 
– unambiguously, loudly and at times triumphantly – that the EU Charter will be repelled in its totality. 
This legislative policy is traceable to the “leave” vote campaign as noted above. It is put into effect by 
a relatively simple legislative mechanism.  
The Withdrawal Act repeals the European Communities Act 197264, preserves laws which were made 
in the UK for the purpose of implementing EU obligations and, thirdly, converts existing EU law into 
domestic law, subject to specified exceptions. The EU Charter is one of the most striking of these 
                                                     
60 https://brexitlawni.org  
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exceptions. Thus it will cease to form part of domestic UK law after “exit day”65. This statutory measure 
is a clear implementation of those aspects of the “leave” movement which quickly found a popular (and 
populist?) target in the shape of a visionary and progressive instrument of EU law which (via the narrow 
UK mindset) confers a series of legally enforceable rights and benefits on the citizens of other European 
countries. The unassailable juridical reality that it confers precisely the same rights and benefits on all 
citizens of the UK exercising, or wishing to exercise, free movement rights in other EU countries has 
been diluted and ignored to the point of virtual submergence. Ditto the incontrovertible factual reality 
of the progressive, and enduring, reliance of the UK economy on the citizens of other EU Member States 
exercising their free movement rights – and doing so strictly in accordance with the relevant legal rules. 
The EU Charter, of course, applies only when a Member State is acting within EU law.66 However, 
ambiguity and inconsistency are immediately identifiable: the Charter codifies certain existing rights 
which under the Withdrawal Act will be retained in UK domestic law. By section 5(5) of the Act, 
furthermore, any fundamental rights or principles under EU law which exists irrespective of the Charter 
will be retained in domestic law. There will also be “retained EU law” and “retained EU case law”. 
It is important to add at once, however, that no element of so-called “retained EU law” has any 
guaranteed future existence in the United Kingdom. Given the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, 
which will be reinvigorated by the recovery of the partial loss of sovereignty which membership of the 
EU entails for all Member States, democratically made legislation will be capable of eliminating or 
diluting any measure of retained EU law at any time. Parliament will be accountable to the UK 
electorate.  
The elimination of the EU Charter from the UK legal system will have a series of currently 
imponderable consequences. One of these is the extent to which human rights protection in the UK 
becomes diminished by the absence of the Charter. This will be an interesting test of just how efficacious 
a measure of fundamental rights protection the Charter actually is.  
This review and analysis will, inevitably, entail juxtaposing the EU Charter with the ECHR. The 
latter (most of it) will, for a period at least, continue to be a major source of directly effective human 
rights protection in the UK. While previously, and unlike in many other Member States, the ECHR did 
not form part of domestic UK law by virtue of the “dualist” constitutionally doctrine, whereby 
unincorporated international treaties and conventions form no part of municipal law, most of the ECHR 
rights became directly effective in UK law via a measure of primary legislation namely the Human 
Rights Act 1998.67 The ECHR belongs to the realm of the Council of Europe, which remains an 
organisation separate from the EU governed by its own rules, norms, systems and procedures. Continued 
UK membership of the Council of Europe is not at present under threat. Furthermore, the Human Rights 
Act, being pure domestic law, will remain in force.  
However, the EU Charter being of demonstrably greater reach than the ECHR, UK citizens will no 
longer have the protection of the Charter’s additional rights, the soi – disant “added value”: the specific 
rights of the child; the array of social protections contained in Title IV; freedom to conduct a business; 
the strong anti-discrimination provisions; freedom of the arts and sciences; a right of conscientious 
objection; freedom to choose an occupation; a right to asylum and against refoulement; a right to data 
protection; the prohibition against human trafficking; a right to marry not restricted to different-sex 
couples; the right to physical and mental integrity; and a guarantee of human dignity. This is an 
impressive list indeed.  
Some of the EU Charter’s additional rights and protections are recognised in certain measures of UK 
domestic law (eg data protection and protection from human trafficking) or in the ECTHR jurisprudence 
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(eg certain types of physical and mental integrity), others will simply evaporate overnight, a particular 
and worrying – illustration being the more expansive rights of the child. Furthermore, ensuring “parallel” 
rights in UK domestic law may not benefit from the expansion and fortification which, historically, has 
emerged from the progressive interpretation of the CJEU. Ditto as regards future EU legislative 
measures of expansion and fortification.  
The EU Charter provides visible, accessible and comprehensive protection of a broad range of 
individual rights and freedoms. It’s potency derives in particular from the position which it occupies at 
the apex of the international legal order to which it belongs. This will disappear overnight on Brexit day. 
Thereafter, subject to interim and other special arrangements, EU citizens living and working in the UK 
will no longer have the protection of EU law. They will, rather, be exclusively subject to domestic UK 
law, with whatever international influences – the most notable continuing to be the ECHR – this may 
contain. 
In the first iteration of this paper I described the impact of the EU law on domestic UK law as 
relatively tepid.68 This was followed by the publication of some interesting data to the end of 2017. As 
of then:  
 The EU courts addressed the Charter in 719 judgments. 
 Of these, 48 cases originated in the UK.  
 On closer analysis, the figure of 48 is exaggerated, and is in fact closer to 30. 
 In contrast, 103 cases originated from Germany, 75 from Italy, 55 from Spain and 45 from France.  
Some of the UK Charter cases were of undeniable importance:  
(a) NS decided that the UK may not transfer an asylum claimant to another Member State where there 
are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be exposed to a real risk of inhuman or 
degrading treatment flowing from systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and reception 
conditions in that country.69 
(b) The case of Kadi II concerned the freezing of assets of a person suspected of involvement in terrorist 
activities and the balance to be struck between the rights of the defence and the right to effective 
judicial protection (on the one hand) and security considerations (on the other).70 
(c) In Tele 2 Swerige and Watson, the CJEU ruled that national legislation authorising the general and 
indiscriminate retention of all traffic and location data of all subscribers and registered users relating 
to all means of electronic communication was prohibited by Directive 2002/58 (on privacy and 
electronic communications) interpreted in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 of the Charter.71 
It is instructive to reflect on a concrete case illustration. The case of ZZ72 threw into sharp relief that the 
fair trial protections enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter exceed those of Article 6 ECHR, the former 
extending beyond the narrowly drawn category of a person’s “determination of his civil rights and 
obligations or of any criminal charge against him”. Article 47 extends to administrative proceedings, 
for example relating to tax. As ZZ demonstrates, the reach of Article 47 also extends to immigration 
proceedings. The person concerned, a dual French and Algerian national, was refused admission to the 
United Kingdom which purported to invoke the permitted restriction on the free movement of EU 
citizens on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health.73 The appeal lay to the 
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judicialised tribunal known as “SIAC”74 which, in accordance with its procedural arrangements, conduct 
both “open” and “closed” hearings. The outcome was an affirmation of the executive’s decision, based 
substantially on so-called “closed” materials viz evidence not disclosed to the subject. The CJEU 
emphasised the following: the onus rests on the relevant national authority to prove that state security 
would be compromised by full disclosure of relevant evidence to the subject; and, where this is 
demonstrated, the national procedure must ensuring compliance with the adversarial principle to the 
greatest extent possible, entailing the maximum disclosure possible to the subject.75 
The enhanced fair trial protections which the EU citizen in ZZ was able to invoke depended on the 
Charter and, hence, will not be expressly available post-Brexit. Another illustration belonging to the 
immigration sphere of reduced protections post-Brexit is provided by Carpenter76 where EU law family 
life rights were successfully invoked in the context of a UK citizen exercising free movement rights and 
operating to prevent the removal from the United Kingdom of that person’s spouse illegally present 
there. Article 8 ECHR would not have afforded this level of protection.  
Yet another sobering reflection arises out of the broad consensus that the true potential of the EU 
Charter remains unfulfilled. Thus the predictable flourishing of the Charter via the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU will have no direct influence on the UK legal system. Furthermore, and independently, as the 
doctrine of the supremacy of EU law will disappear from the UK legal system, UK courts will no longer 
be subject to the obligation to disapply national legal rules conflicting with directly applicable or 
effective EU law.77 As already highlighted, much of the ECHR, via the Human Rights Act, will continue 
to form part of domestic UK law. However, the “disapplication” duty of the UK judge, just noted, 
contrasts sharply with the most intrusive of the human rights remedies available under domestic law, 
namely a (mere) declaration that a specified provision of parliamentary legislation is incompatible with 
one of the protected ECHR rights78.  
Also gone forever – again subject to interim and special arrangements – will be the ability of any 
person living in the UK to challenge acts and decisions of the executive or UK legislation said to be 
incompatible with fundamental EU rights, the Charter or, for that matter, any measure of EU law which 
is not “retained” in domestic UK law. Such a challenge will not be possible before the UK courts. 
Furthermore, the invaluable mechanism whereby the UK courts could seek preliminary rulings from the 
CJEU will be eliminated.  
This significant lacuna will not be remedied by the continuing existence of the Agreement on the 
European Economic Area (“EEA”) to which the UK will remain a party. By virtue of the EEA principle 
of homogeneity, new EU legislation is routinely transformed into the body of EEA law. The mechanism 
for this is the simple one of annexing such legislation to the EEA agreement.79  
Collectively, the adoption of the EU Charter, the Citizenship Directive and a series of detailed 
measures in the field of asylum are arguably the most progressive and impressive EU legislative 
achievements. While imperfections and shortcomings have been exposed in the CEAS, the Dublin 
Regulation in particular, the EU, in common with the best democratic institutions throughout the world, 
has demonstrated its capacity for review, revision and improvement.80 In the promotion of the Treaty 
values of freedom, justice and security, an elaborate European Arrest Warrant Scheme has also been 
painstakingly devised. All of the foregoing measures, subject only to time limited interim arrangements 
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and the intrinsically precarious device of “retained EU law”, will fade from the UK legal system in the 
post-Brexit era. 
Brexit, with all of its implications, is unlikely to occur in isolation. There has been a concerted 
political campaign, vociferous and at times aggressive, espousing the repeal of the Human Rights Act 
1998. If this were to eventuate the UK’s separation from the democratic states of Europe would become 
accentuated, with correspondingly enhanced isolationism. This retrograde step would result in the 
ECHR being banished once again to the distant plane of international law, excised from UK domestic 
law. Those living and working in the UK would no longer be able to invoke its protections before the 
courts. This would be supremely ironic in a country where imaginative and progressive lawyers and 
judges relentlessly developed the status and influence of this international treaty in the UK during a 
period of some two decades preceding the seminal Human Rights Act. The cumbersome, slow, 
expensive and uncertain process of individually petitioning the ECTHR – and this only after exhausting 
all domestic remedies – would return. It is difficult to describe this as other than profoundly retrograde. 
Some of those campaigning for the repelled of the Human Rights Act have claimed that this will be 
counter balanced by the adoption of a “purely British” Bill of Rights. There are, of course, many 
imponderables. However, at this remove, given particularly the antipathy to the Human Rights Act, it 
seems far from probable that any Bill of Rights would mirror the protections of the ECHR. What is even 
more predictable is that such a measure would not replicate the EU Charter.  
It follows from the above that the continuing operation of (much of) the ECHR in the UK legal 
system will provide but a limited counter balance to the negative effects identified. The limitations of 
Article 8 ECHR in protecting migrants will be exposed. There will be increasing awareness of the 
orientation of the ECTHR jurisprudence, which has entailed much deference to state sovereignty in the 
sphere of migration. Successful resistance of deportation based on Article 8 ECHR has been relatively 
infrequent. Family life has been narrowly defined and private life is routinely disregarded81.  
The heavy balancing of the scales in favour of the State, based on the sovereign right to control the 
movement of persons across international borders emerges most clearly in the landmark decision of 
Abdulaziz v United Kingdom [App No 9214/80]. This sovereign right to control the entry of non-
nationals extends to control of their residence and expulsion82. This trend in the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
has prevailed notwithstanding that, in the context of a human rights protection instrument, it gives 
precedence to the principle of state control, namely a provocative that neither affirms human rights nor 
is contained in the text of the ECHR. 
The potential of Article 8 ECHR to provide a vehicle for family reunification is equally limited. 
Family reunification, in this context, entails the entry of non-nationals, most frequently nationals of non-
EU countries, for the purpose of family life with a family member or members already lawfully present 
on the territory of the state concerned. The best known of the ECTHR decisions in this respect are Sen 
v Netherlands83 and Mayeka v – Belgium84. In the UK, a series of judicial decisions giving effect to this 
discrete stream of Strasbourg jurisprudence began with R (ZAT) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department85. As these decisions demonstrate, where Article 8 can be invoked it is capable of providing 
the most practical and expeditious remedial mechanism available for family reunification purposes.  
In the search for factors which may provide a counter balance to the foreseeable post-Brexit human 
rights protection backward slide, attention turns to the increasing alignment of the CJEU and the 
                                                     
81 Illustrated in Senchishak v Finland [5049/12], unreported 18 November 2014.  
82 See for example Moustaquim v Belgium [App No 12313/86]. 
83 [2003] 36 EHRR 7. 
84 [2008] 46 EHRR 23. 
85 IJR [2016] UKUT 61 (IAC).  
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ECTHR. This belongs to a context where the EU en bloc is to accede to the ECHR86. There has been a 
progressively discernible jurisprudential dialogue between these two national courts. This has evolved 
almost imperceptibly in the absence of any coercive legal obligation to this effect. The “constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States”, a familiar phrase, has increasing resonance in this context. 
This “cross-pollination” seems merely logical given the strong association between ECHR rights and 
the general principles of EU law. This is readily identifiable in CJEU decisions such as NS v SSHD87 
and MSS v Belgium and Greece88. Examples can be readily multiplied.  
Thus, post-Brexit, it is foreseeable that both the EU Charter and the general principles of EU law, 
particularly insofar as these have been absorbed within the ECHR and the Strasbourg jurisprudence, will 
have indirect influence in the UK legal system. This will occur in a context where it is the declared 
philosophy of the ECTHR to treat the ECHR as a living instrument.  
I consider it appropriate to comment briefly on the Council of Europe (“COE”) and its organs. Post 
– Brexit there will, I apprehend, be increased public awareness in the UK of the work of the COE and 
its achievements to date. While public debate has, predictably, been focused on (a) the influence and 
implications of EU law in the UK and, to a lesser extent, external EU policy and international relations 
and (b) the much maligned ECHR, it being frequently (conveniently?) overlooked that this finds 
expression in the UK legal system in a measure of primary legislation adopted by a democratically 
elected legislature, namely the Human Rights Act, I would expect attention to turn to some of the other 
COE Conventions which, for a variety of reasons, have had limited visibility and exposure.  
Politicians, academics, lawyers and other professionals may well wake up to the reality that this 
organisation, which was born in 1949 with ten subscribing states (including the UK), has sought to 
achieve one of its aims, namely the protection and promotion of the rule of law and the fostering of legal 
co-operation among States Parties, by the adoption of some 200 conventions and treaties addressing an 
impressively broad range of topics with a human rights emphasis:  
 The Convention on action against trafficking in human beings. 
 The Convention on the protection of children against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse.  
 The Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence.  
 The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.  
 The European Social Charter. 
 The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. 
 The Anti-Doping Convention. 
One of the COE organs, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, has been particularly 
and visibly active during several decades. Others with an increasing profile include the European 
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), the Venice Commission, the European Directorate 
for the Quality of Medicines, the European Pharmacopoeia and the European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance. Furthermore, it is not difficult to foresee a re-awakening of awareness of the 
institutions of the COE: the Council of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly, the COE Secretariat, the 
Secretary General and the Permanent representatives and ambassadors who are accredited by each of 
the 47 States Parties. To this list one adds the Congress of the Council of Europe which was established 
in 1994 and comprises political representatives of local and regional authorities of all States parties. See 
also the European Charter of Local Self-Government (1985).  
                                                     
86 A process that is suspended following Opinion 2/13 which held that accession would be incompatible with the existing 
Treaties. 
87 [2012] 2 CMLR 9. 
88 [2011] 53 EHRR 2.  
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The close association between the Statute of the Council of Europe and the admittedly more elaborate 
and intricate constitutional instruments establishing and governing the modern EU is striking. By Article 
1(a) of the Statute:  
“The aim of the Council of Europe is to establish a greater unity between its members for the purpose 
of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and 
facilitating their economic and social progress.”  
Acceding states must affirm their commitment to harmony, co-operation, good governance and human 
rights, the principle of the rule of law and the guarantee of democracy, fundamental human rights and 
freedoms (sound familiar?) 
The Brexit Act 
Finally, for information, I have prepared a separate Schedule (appended) outlining briefly some of the 
more important provisions of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. 
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European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 
Some Stand Out Provisions 
1. “Exit day” was initially specified as 29 March 2019, at 11.00pm: section 20(2) (more recently 
amended, in the withdrawal debacle) 
2. Member State “does not include the United Kingdom”: ditto.  
3. “EU-derived domestic legislation … continues to have effect in domestic law on and after exit day”: 
section 2(1).  
4. “Direct EU legislation …. forms part of domestic law on and after exit day”: section 3(1).  
5. “Any rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures which, 
immediately before exit day –  
(a) Are recognised and available in domestic law by virtue of section 2(1) of the 
European Communities Act 1972, and  
(b) Are enforced, allowed and followed accordingly  
Continue on and after exit day to be recognised and available in domestic law (and to be 
enforced, allowed and followed accordingly)”: section 4(1). 
6. “The principle of the supremacy of EU law does not apply to any enactment or rule of law past or 
made after exit day”: section 5(1). 
7. “Accordingly, the principle of the supremacy of EU law continues to apply on or after exit day so 
far as relevant to the interpretation, disapplication or quashing of any enactment or rule of law past 
or made before exit day”: section 5(2).  
8. “The Charter of Fundamental Rights is not part of domestic law on or after exit day”: section 5(4).  
9. Fundamental rights or principles which exist “irrespective of the Charter” remain part of UK 
domestic law: section 5(5).  
10. “A court or tribunal (a) is not bound by any principles laid down, or any decisions made, on or 
after exit day by the European Court and (b) cannot refer any matter to the European Court on or 
after exit day”: section 6(1).  
11. A court or tribunal “… may have regard to anything done on or after exit day by the European 
Court, another EU entity or the EU so far as it is relevant to any matter before the court or 
tribunal”: section 6(2). 
12. “Any question as to the validity, meaning or effect of any retained EU law is to be decided, so far 
as that law is unmodified on or after exit day and so far as they are relevant to it –  
(a) In accordance with any retained case law and any retained general principles of EU 
law, and  
(b) Having regard (among other things) to the limits, immediately before exit day, of EU 
competences”: section 6(3).  
13. The UK Supreme Court “is not bound by any retained EU case law”: section 6(4).  
14. Section 6(7): definitions of “retained case law”, “retained domestic case law”, “retained EU case 
law”, “retained EU law” and “retained general principles of EU law”. The latter is defined as:  
“The general principles of EU law, as they have effect in EU law immediately before 
exit day and so far as they –  
(a) Relate to anything to which section 2, 3 or 4 applies, and  
(b) Are not excluded by section 5 or Schedule 1.” 
15. The legislative mechanisms for modifying retained EU law: section 7.  
16. The controversial fall-back provision, “dealing with deficiencies arising from withdrawal”:  
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“A Minister of the Crown may by regulations make such provision as the Minister 
considers appropriate to prevent, remedy or mitigate –  
(a) Any failure of retained EU law to operate effectively, or  
(b) Any other deficiency in retained EU law  
arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU”: section 8(1). And 
see the elaborate outworkings of the concept of “deficiencies” in section 8(2) – (9).  
17. Some special provisions for Northern Ireland: section 10.  
18. The withdrawal agreement can be ratified by the executive only if:  
(a) It is approved by a resolution of the House of Commons; 
(b) The HOC motion has been debated by the House of Lords; and  
(c) An Act of Parliament containing provision for the implementation of the withdrawal 
agreement has been made. 
See section 13(1).  
19. 21 January 2019: the beginning of a five day time period during which a Minister of the Crown 
must make a statement setting out how the government proposes to proceed regarding the 
withdrawal agreement: section 12(11).  
20. Notably, special provision is made for environmental protection: section 16. 
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